Brzezinski finds war “terribly exhilarating”, hates Russia, admits to controlling President Carter, and introduced US Military presence in the Middle East

The Grand Chessboard, Zbig & Israeli PM Menachem Begin play chess at Camp David in 1978

This is Zbigniew Brzezinski’s “Exit Interview” and was conducted by Marie Allen on 20 February, 1981, approximately one month after Carter left office and was replaced by Ronald Reagan.

ALLEN:  I’ve seen in print your story of the day that you learned that Poland had fallen. (During WWII) Could you recount that on tape?  How old you were and what the circumstances were.
BRZEZINSKI:  I have seen that story and I think that it was somewhat exaggerated because actually Poland didn’t fall in a single day.  It was overrun in the course of several weeks and, of course, it was extremely unpleasant; but also, at the same time, terribly exhilarating.  One had a sense of struggle for something that one believed in and that was quite important.

War is “terribly exhilarating.” Of course, Brzezinski is a warmonger.

ALLEN:  Do you remember a particular day in which these events culminated finally and that your father learned…
BRZEZINSKI:  Probably the capitulation of Warsaw, that would be one particular moment that was poignant.  The other day was, some two weeks earlier when the Soviets attacked Poland stabbing it in the back and, thereby, sealing its fate.  For that attack made the resistance to the Nazi’s impossible.
ALLEN:  Did your father tell you about these things?
BRZEZINSKI:  Oh no.  I followed them myself.  I was a young kid, very young.  But, I read the newspapers regularly and I listened to the radio.
ALLEN:  You were, what, eleven or twelve?
BRZEZINSKI:  I was eleven.

So.. Brzezinski has had hatred for Russia since he was 11 years old.  He is a revanchist. His primary Modus Operandi is that he wants to smash Russia for stabbing his native Poland in the back during WWII.

Zbig also helped found the Trilateral Commission with David Rockefeller, and picked Jimmy Carter as a member, before Carter became president.

BRZEZINSKI:  I went to Japan. I wrote a book about Japan’s world role.  That, in turn, led to the formation of the Trilateral Commission which worked on the relations between Europe and the United States.  That, in turn, led to my meeting Jimmy Carter.
ALLEN:  Do you remember the day in which you first met him and what the circumstances were?
BRZEZINSKI:  I first met him at one of the meetings of the Trilateral Commission.  He was a member of it.
ALLEN:  In New York?
BRZEZINSKI:  In New York.  I was one of those who selected him to be a member. Subsequently, in one of the Commission’s meetings in Japan, he asked me, out of the blue, to take part in a press conference that he was giving, to accompany him to it. Which I did.  And I became more impressed by him and it was then that I decided even though he had only two percent national recognition, not support, just recognition.  I then decided, at that moment, to support him for the Presidency.
ALLEN:  Was there a good personal chemistry between the two of you, do you think, from the beginning?
BRZEZINSKI:  Yes.  It was always a kind of relaxed and mutually confident relationship. Somehow we meshed well.  And I just felt, you know, reasonably well with him and I think he felt the same way with me.  Somehow or other we complemented each other. Somehow or other I also had the feeling that I understood him.  As I worked with him in the White House, I was struck very often at how I could anticipate what he was going to say or how he was going to react.  Almost unfailingly, I would know what he was going to say before he said it.  Or, I could anticipate his reaction to a situation.

and, therefore, manipulate him?

BRZEZINSKI:  I always wanted the job of Assistant for National Security Affairs in the White House, for a very simple reason.  It was a more important job. (than Secretary of State) It was the key job. It involved the integration of the top inputs from State, Defense, and CIA.  And, above all, it meant that you were close to a President whom I knew would be an activist.  And, therefore, being close to him and working with him was centrally important.

in other words, he was Carter’s controller. Zbig was the filter thru which all information passing from the State Department, Defense Department, & CIA went to the President. And since he could “anticipate how he was going to react” and “know what he was going to say before he said it”, he could frame the information in such a way that Carter would choose the path Zbig laid out for him to choose.  This is the function of a controller.  Brzezinski is a chess player & strategist. His most (in)famous book is called “The Grand Chessboard“. Carter is simply one of Zbig’s pawns. The chess metaphor appears over and over when dealing with Brzezinski.

BRZEZINSKI:  I believed that one of the things that history is going to give Carter credit for is that his policies had, in fact, a lot of substance.

policies dictated by Brzezinski, to be sure

BRZEZINSKI: I think where he failed was in not communicating effectively the substance of his policies to the public and making the public appreciate how much is being done.  He loved formal speeches and he wasn’t good at them.

But Carter failed by “not communicating effectively the substance of his policies to the public and making the public appreciate how much is being done.”

Carter failed, not Brzezinski.

BRZEZINSKI: And, at the same time, no one else could do it because if I did it the whole State Department would jump all over my back–and Vance couldn’t do it and Muskie was not there long enough to do it.

In other words, Brzezinski needed a puppet to accomplish his aims, Carter.

ALLEN:  What do you think is your greatest contribution in the foreign policy area?

BRZEZINSKI: I would say the initiation of the regional security framework for the Persian Gulf, the concept and all of the steps taken to actually introduce the American military presence into the region…

so he introduced the US military presence into the Middle East, which has worked out so well..

BRZEZINSKI: …together with the firmer measures against the Soviets in Afghanistan and so forth.

by this he means starting the Afghan war (the Mujahadeen & eventually Al Qaeda & the War on Terror) and smashing the Soviet Union.

BRZEZINSKI: On the negative side, I think what I contributed was, and I’ve been reviewing the record recently and I was struck by it, some stimulus to an earlier display of American tough-mindedness, vis-a-vis, the Soviets.  If I hadn’t pushed I don’t think we would have done it.  In many instances I think we would have acquiesced.  It’s either a question of messages to Brezhnev or how we responded or how we reacted.

In other words, the lead up to the Evil Empire and the Reagan/Bush years.

BRZEZINSKI: I also objected to acquiescence to the Vietnamese expansion in Cambodia, and I objected to any recognition of Vietnam.  I objected to recognition of Angola and to the establishment of normal relations with Cuba unless the Cubans released political prisoners and got out of Africa.  I think if I hadn’t taken these positions, we probably would have accommodated ourselves to the Cubans, Angolans, and Vietnamese.

So Brzezinski was an obstacle to peace…

original pdf: brzezinski-zbig-19810220-exit-interview-cambodia-vietnam-angola-cuba